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This article considers the extent to which a claimed process must be repeatable or 
reproducible in order to be patentable according to Australian patent law. It asks 
whether a process must yield identical or near-identical results each time the process 
is invoked, or if not, what degree of repeatability is required. The question is relevant 
when considering, among other things, the patentability of some methods of medical 
treatment and diagnosis, biotechnology inventions and business methods.  
 
I INTRODUCTION 
The question considered in this article is whether Australian patent law contains a 
requirement that in order to be patentable, a claimed process must be repeatable or 
reproducible such that identical or near-identical results are obtained each time the 
process is invoked, or if not, what degree of repeatability is required. The need for 
repeatability and the extent to which it is required is examined in light of the fact that 
the operation of some processes is subject to extrinsic forces, while other processes 
allow for decision-making by whoever uses the process.  
Extrinsic forces to a process are events external to, or that originate outside, the steps 
of the process. They may be atypical and unforeseen by the inventor at the time the 
process is first created, or they may typical and foreseeable events that impact upon 
the running of a process. Such extrinsic forces might be at play each time a process is 
invoked, might occur sporadically and unpredictably, or may even occur only in the 
tiniest percentage of cases in which a process is invoked. For example, an extrinsic 
force operating on a method of medical treatment might be the operation of another 
drug in a person’s body, or the effects of a particular person’s atypical genetic 
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makeup, the presence and the effects of which were not anticipated by the inventor of 
a claimed medical treatment method. An extrinsic force operating on a method of 
medical treatment might have effects whereby medical treatment administered to 
patients with atypical physical characteristics is unsuccessful, when the vast majority 
of patients take the benefit of the treatment as intended and without complications.1 
Similarly, where the operation a business method, such as a method for managing (or 
hedging) the consumption risks associated with selling a commodity at a fixed price 
for a given period,2 gives different results depending on the various extrinsic market 
forces at play. These market forces might be caused by the weather and might include 
extended periods of extreme hot or cold, or extended periods of mild temperatures, 
that affect consumer demand for electricity to power for air conditioning and heating, 
or natural disasters which destroy a part of the electricity grid, or significantly reduce 
the supply of coal that is necessary to run coal-fired power stations.  
Processes that allow for decision making by the person implementing the process are 
generally those that are described with a level of specificity that sets out all the steps 
of the process, but not to a level of specificity that exactly describes exactly how each 
of those steps of the process is to be implemented. In the absence of such information, 
the person implementing the process will need to make decisions as to how certain 
steps comprising the process are to be implemented. To be clear, what is described 
here is not a case of the person using a claimed process deviating from the steps of the 
process described by the inventor – what is described is a process that imposes the 
need to make choices or permits choices to be made by a person faithfully following 
the steps of the process. 
For instance, a process might call for the addition of a particular substance to a 
mixture, but rather than specifying the quantity of that substance to add, might give an 
acceptable range, whereby adding different quantities within the range would bear 
different results. One example of this kind is where a patent describes a method of 
producing a physical article which, at the end of the process, will be one of a range of 
colours depending upon the concentration or amount of certain inputs used in the 
                                                 
1 For example, see the method of medical treatment considered in Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic Supplies 
Pty Ltd (1992) 25 IPR 119 (Gummow J). 
2 For example, see the business method considered in In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en 
banc) cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009); Bilski v Kappos, 561 US ___ 
(2010).  
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process, where the exact concentrations of amounts are not specified but an 
acceptable range of measures of each ingredient is specified.3  
There are a number of examples from the world of business methods, where given the 
inputs used, namely data or information, processes will not produce identical results 
in the way a machine-press might, but can be expected to achieve outcomes 
commensurate with the inputs used and the nature of the process. They include 
financial services or transactions that implement some sort of financial product, 
service or transaction, or disclose a means of conducting a financial transaction. 
Methods of this kind might involve means of implementing: automated transaction 
processing and transaction settlement systems; commodities or other trading systems; 
pricing systems; hedging strategies; trading strategies; customer loyalty schemes; 
transaction validation or verification methods; purchase order systems; and inventory 
management systems. They also include: inventions in the information dissemination 
or advertising category that describe means of communicating or disseminating 
information to the public or a section of the public; inventions in the information or 
computer security category that describe such things as authentication systems, 
including biometric authentication systems, computer firewall systems, software 
security control systems and methods, and means of secure data transmission; 
methods of applying the law in a particular way and other means of structuring legal 
rights and obligations; business schemes such as a means of structuring a business and 
means of conducting commerce (including electronic commerce); and processes of 
this kind implemented in software.4  
Another example is a method of creating a particular style of art, where at the end of 
the process the art style is recognisable and every work created using the process has 
a consistency of appearance, but where each the works are not identical because the 
artist using the process for instance selects colours or arrangements or textures as 
inputs to the process. It is to be remembered that art itself is not patentable as a work 
of art is subject matter that lies in the realm of the fine arts, rather than the useful arts. 
However, a method that describes a mechanical process of producing a work of art 
                                                 
3 For example, see the method of producing of colouring suitable for dyeing and printing fabric 
considered in Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik v Levinstein (1887) 12 App Cas 710. 
4 These examples are taken from: Ben McEniery, ‘An Empirical Study of Business Method Patent 
Applications Filed in Australia 2000-2009’ (2012) 89 (June) Intellectual Property Forum 22, 28.  
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may be patentable, particularly if it is scalable to produce works in commercial 
quantities.5 
An example from the realm of surgery of a process that concerns both the effect of 
extrinsic forces and decision-making by the person implementing the process might 
be a surgical method combining known surgical techniques in a particular order to 
create a hitherto unknown surgical method whereby a surgeon would need to exercise 
a discretion as to how each of the known surgical techniques is performed. 
Arguably, some process should be more easily reproduced than others – an industrial 
manufacturing process by which ball bearings are manufactured will ordinarily be 
more susceptible with successful reproduction and suffer a lesser rate of failure than a 
biological process for the manufacture or production of biological entity.6  
In terms of its structure, the article begins with an overview of the requirements for 
patentability set out in Australia’s national patents legislation, the Patents Act 1990 
(Cth) (‘the Act’), and in turn identifies the elements of patentability that may cause a 
patent for a claimed invention that lacks the necessary quality of repeatability to be 
refused or revoked. It will be seen that the requirements for patentability relevant in 
this instance are whether a process lies within the bounds of patentable subject matter 
and whether it meets the requirements that it be useful and sufficiently disclosed.  
The issues of patentable subject matter, usefulness and disclosure are then examined 
in further detail with reference being made to the relevant case law. By way of 
example, the article will consider the need for repeatability in methods of medical 
treatment, methods of medical diagnosis and testing, biotechnology and business 
methods.  
                                                 
5 Ben McEniery, ‘‘Storyline Patents’: Are Plots Patentable?’ (2009) 33(1) Melbourne University Law 
Review 291, 303.  
6 Dmitry Karshtedt, ‘Limits on Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions: Process Elements and Biotechnology’s 
Compliance with the Enablement Requirement’ (2011) 3 Hastings Science & Technology Law Journal 
109. 
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II THE REQUIREMENTS FOR PATENTABILITY 
A Overview 
The requirements for patentability are set out in s 18 of the Act. The section provides 
that, insofar as a standard patent is concerned,7 to be patentable an invention must be 
a ‘manner of manufacture within the meaning of section 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies’, be novel, involve an inventive step, be useful, and not have previously 
been used in secret before the priority date. In addition to the s 18 requirements, s 40 
particularises the manner in which the patentee must disclose the workings of the 
invention to the public. That section provides that the complete patent specification 
must describe the invention clearly and completely enough to enable a person skilled 
in the relevant art to perform the invention,8 and disclose the best method known to 
the applicant of performing the invention.9 Section 40 also requires that the 
specification end with a claim or claims defining the invention,10 which are clear and 
succinct and supported by the matter disclosed in the specification.11 It is the claims 
that define the scope of the invention claimed by the patentee. 
These requirements for patentability exist to ensure that the purposes of patent law are 
met. Possibly the best enunciation of the purposes of patent law, and one that is 
consistent with the aims of the patent system worldwide, comes from the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Aronson v Quick Point Pencil Co.12  
First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it promotes 
disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation and to permit the 
public to practice the invention once the patent expires; third, the stringent 
requirements for patent protection seek to assure that ideas in the public 
domain remain there for the free use of the public.13 
                                                 
7 There are two types of patents in Australia: standard patents and innovation patents. Standard patents 
confer monopoly protection for a term of 20 years: Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 67. Innovation patents, 
which require a significantly lesser degree of inventiveness, are awarded for a term of 8 years: Patents 
Act 1990 (Cth) s 68. The innovation patent is a second-tier patent introduced into Australian law by the 
Patents Amendment (Innovation Patents) Act 2000 (Cth).  
8 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 40(2)(a). 
9 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 40(2)(aa). 
10 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 40(2)(b). 
11 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 40(3). 
12 440 US 257 (1979). 
13 Ibid 262. 
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This rationale for the existence of the patent system is regarded as the justification for 
the existence of patent law in Australia today.14 Invention and innovation is promoted 
in this way because it is thought that innovation, being the creation and 
commercialisation of new and useful products and processes or the improvement 
upon existing products and processes, is the driver by which improved standards of 
living are achievable.15 Economic theory predicts that without this government-
induced intervention in the market, society will not produce technological innovation 
in sufficient quantities – which is a suboptimal outcome.16  
It can be seen that there is no explicit reference to repeatability in the statutory 
patentability requirements described above. The question then is whether such a 
requirement is exists at common law in the cases that have considered the ways in 
which these statutory provisions and their predecessors have operated. The issue of a 
process’s repeatability is not bound up in whether the process is novel, whether it 
involves an inventive step or whether it was used in secret before the priority date. 
Rather, any repeatability requirement is an issue of patentable subject matter, 
usefulness or whether the invention is sufficiently described in the patent 
specification.  
B Patentable Subject Matter  
The starting point of any consideration of the scope of patentable subject matter in 
Australia is the High Court’s landmark 1959 decision, National Research 
Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (‘NRDC’).17 The High Court in 
that case embraced the view that ‘manner of manufacture’ is a broad, flexible and 
dynamic concept.18 The court held that, in order to be a ‘manner of manufacture’ such 
as to fall within the scope of patentable subject matter, an invention must be an 
                                                 
14 CCOM v Jiejing (1994) 122 ALR 417, 433; Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd v Ramset Fasteners 
(Aust) Pty Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 171, 195 (Kirby J); Welcome Real-Time SA v Catuity Inc (2001) 113 
FCR 110, 138 [129] (Heerey J) (‘the law has to strike a balance between, on the one hand, the 
encouragement of true innovation by the grant of monopoly and, on the other, freedom of 
competition.’); Ronald Sackville, ‘Monopoly Versus Freedom of Ideas: The Expansion of Intellectual 
Property’ (2005) 16 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 65, 65-66. 
15 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, The Knowledge-Based Economy (1996) 
3; Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, A New Economy? The Changing Role 
of Innovation and Information Technology in Growth (2000); Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development, The New Economy: Beyond the Hype (2001).  
16 William M Landes and Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 
(2003), 294-333. 
17 (1959) 102 CLR 252 (Dixon CJ, Kitto and Windeyer JJ).  
18 Ibid 270. 
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artificially created state of affairs that belongs to the useful arts and is of economic 
significance, meaning that its value to the country must be in the field of economic 
endeavour, and that it must have ‘an industrial or commercial or trading character’.19  
Perhaps most relevantly to this article, the court found that the manner of manufacture 
test requires that an invention must have a useful and practical application. In this 
connection, the High Court said the following. 
There may indeed be a discovery without invention – either because the 
discovery is of some piece of abstract information without any suggestion of a 
practical application of it to a useful end, or because its application lies outside 
the realm of ‘manufacture’.20 
This is different to the statutory requirement of utility in s 18(1)(c) of the Act, which 
requires that the invention in fact works as promised. In its most recent foray into the 
law of subject matter eligibility in Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty 
Ltd,21 (a case concerning whether methods of medical treatment are patentable subject 
matter), the High Court noted that in its earlier decision in NRDC it had identified a 
particular kind of utility, being a ‘utility in practical affairs’. In the words of Hayne J: 
The utility thus identified was to be found in the consequences of using the 
process (its product, result, outcome or effect). That is, the product, result, 
outcome or effect of the process (the description applied does not matter) had 
to be one having “utility in practical affairs”.22  
In the cases following NRDC, the courts have recognised that there is no prohibition 
on patenting business methods,23 methods of medical treatment,24 and methods of 
medical diagnosis.25  
                                                 
19 Ibid 269-270, 275-277. 
20 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 264. 
21 [2013] HCA 50. 
22 Ibid [87] (Hayne J) citing NRDC at 276. 
23 Welcome Real-Time SA v Catuity Inc (2001) 113 FCR 110; Grant v Commissioner of Patents (2006) 
154 FCR 62. 
24 Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 50; Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic 
Supplies Pty Ltd (1992) 25 IPR 119; Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v FH Faulding & Co Ltd (2000) 97 FCR 
524. 
25 Cancer Voices Australia v Myriad Genetics Inc [2013] FCA 65 (Nicholas J). 
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C The Usefulness Requirement 
The usefulness (or utility) requirement is that an invention must work in the sense that 
it must be possible for a person skilled in the art to reproduce the result promised by 
the patentee in the specification.26 It does not require that an invention be useful in the 
sense that it is objectively worthwhile or commercially viable, but requires only that if 
a particular result is promised, it must be achievable.27 If the invention cannot be 
reproduced to replicate what is promised in the specification, it is not useful and is 
liable to be revoked.28 
A new definition of ‘useful’ was inserted recently in the Act as part of the ‘Raising 
the Bar’ amendments to Australia’s intellectual property legislation.29 This new 
definition in the new s 7A defines ‘useful’ in a negative way, but purports by sub-
section (3) only to add to the meaning of the term as it has developed in the case law.  
7A Meaning of useful 
(1) For the purposes of this Act, an invention is taken not to be useful unless a 
specific, substantial and credible use for the invention (so far as claimed) is 
disclosed in the complete specification. 
... 
(3) Subsection (1) does not otherwise affect the meaning of the word useful in 
this Act. 
The terms, specific, substantial and credible are not defined in the Act. However, the 
explanatory memorandum to the amending legislation provides that these terms are 
intended to have the same meanings ‘as is currently given by the US courts and the 
United States Patent and Trade Mark Office (USPTO).’ 30 According to that 
                                                 
26 Ehrlich v Ihlee (1888) 5 RPC 437, 455; Rehm Pty Ltd v Westers Security Systems (International) Pty 
Ltd (1988) 11 IPR 286, 305; Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic Supplies (1992) 25 IPR 119, 142-143; Welcome 
Real-Time SA v Catuity Inc (2001) 113 FCR 110 ,144. Note that Art. 1 of the Australia – United States 
Free Trade Agreement, 18 May 2004 (entered into force 1 January 2005) (AUSFTA) defines ‘useful’ 
as meaning of ‘industrial application’. 
27 Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd v Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 171, 187; 
Lane Fox v Kensington and Knightsbridge Electric Lighting Company [1892] 3 Ch 424, 430-431.  
28 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 138(3)(b). 
29 Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth). 
30 Explanatory Memorandum, Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Bill 2011 
(Cth), 43. 
 9
explanatory memorandum, the courts in the United States interpret those terms in 
following ways: 
‘specific’ means a use specific to the subject matter claimed and can ‘provide 
a well-defined and particular benefit to the public.’ 
‘substantial’ means the claimed invention does not require further research to 
identify or reasonably confirm a ‘real world use’. ‘An application must show 
that an invention is useful to the public as disclosed in its current form, not 
that it prove useful at some future date after further research’. 
an asserted use will be ‘credible’ ‘unless there is evidence that the invention is 
inoperative (i.e. does not operate to produce the results claimed by the patent 
application) or there is reason to doubt the objective truth of the statements in 
the specification.’31 
The new s 7A definition would arguably have little bearing upon the issue of 
repeatability. Rather, it is the ordinary notion of usefulness developed in the cases, 
that the invention must work or function as promised in the specification, that is 
pertinent. The argument is that if a process cannot be repeated with identical or near 
identical results, or with an acceptable rate of failure, then it is not useful as it cannot 
achieve the result promised by the patentee.  
D Sufficiency of Description 
As is the case in other jurisdictions, patent law in Australia demands that in exchange 
for the monopoly protection a patentee is granted, the patentee must disclose the 
invention and its workings to the public in a patent specification at the time a patent 
application is filed. This disclosure is the quid pro quo of the patent bargain.32 The 
patent specification must disclose the invention in a sufficiently clear and complete 
manner, in order for the invention to be performed by a person skilled in the relevant 
art,33 as well as the best method known to the applicant of performing the invention.34 
The patent specification must also set out claims that define the scope of the patent 
                                                 
31 Explanatory Memorandum, Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Bill 2011 
(Cth), 43-44 citing In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371, 76 USPQ2d 1225, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2005) and In 
re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223, 169 USPQ 367, 369 (CCPA 1971). 
32 American Cyanamid Company (Dann’s) Patent (Dann’s Patent) [1971] RPC 425, 451-452. 
33 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 40(2)(a). 
34 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 40(2)(aa). 
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monopoly sought by the applicant.35 There must be consistency between what is 
described in the patent specification and the claims made. The patent claims must be 
‘clear and succinct and fairly based on the matter described in the specification’36 
(which is known as the ‘fair basis’ requirement). 
An invention is not sufficiently described in the specification if a person skilled in the 
relevant art would not be able to understand how to perform the invention.37 Further, 
the information disclosed must enable a skilled addressee to perform each of the 
claims without that person needing to devise new inventions or additions or to engage 
in prolonged study or undue experimentation.38 
E Relationship Between Patentable Subject Matter, Usefulness and Disclosure 
Questions concerning the repeatability of process inventions highlight that issues of 
usefulness and whether sufficient disclosure has been made are often intertwined. 
Gummow J, in Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd,39 explained the distinction 
between insufficiency in an invention’s description and a lack of utility: insufficiency 
occurs when the invention cannot be reproduced following a reading of the 
specification, and there is a lack of utility when the invention can be made, but that 
when it has been made, it does not work.40 His Honour of course acknowledged that 
the distinction between issues of insufficiency and lack of utility are ‘often less clear 
in practice’.41  
Likewise, there is arguably overlap between the patentable subject matter requirement 
and the disclosure requirements. If a patent applicant’s disclosure is insufficient to 
enable a person skilled in the art to perform an invention, it is likely that the invention 
so described will not be capable of producing a specific, useful result of the kind 
required by NRDC and thus not be patentable subject matter. Similarly, there is 
arguably an overlap between the patentable subject matter requirement that an 
                                                 
35 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 40(2)(b). 
36 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 40(3).  
37 Samuel Taylor Pty Ltd v SA Brush Co Ltd (1950) 83 CLR 617. 
38 Samuel Taylor Pty Ltd v SA Brush Co Ltd (1950) 83 CLR 617, 623, 625, 626; Kimberly-Clark 
Australia v Arico Trading International (2001) 207 CLR 1, 16-17 quoting No-Fume Ltd v Frank 
Pitchford & Co Ltd (1935) 52 RPC 231, 243 (Romer LJ); Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries (1988) 
13 IPR 385; Valensi v British Radio Corporation [1973] RPC 337, 376-377. 
39 (1992) 25 IPR 119 (Gummow J). 
40 Ibid 142. 
41 Ibid. 
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invention must be of useful and practical application and the statutory requirement of 
usefulness. If what is described in the patent specification does not work as promised, 
it will not be useful and will unlikely be regarded as being of a sufficient practical 
application to fall within the NRDC conception of patentable subject matter.  
III REPEATABILITY AND PATENTABILITY 
A Manufacturing Processes 
The idea that the capacity of a process to produce identical or near-identical results 
every time it is invoked might depend upon decisions made by the person invoking 
the process was accepted as early as in 1887 in the case of Badische Anilin and Soda 
Fabrik v Levinstein.42 The case concerned a process of producing red and brown 
colouring matters to be used in dyeing and printing.43 From the judgment it is 
apparent that the process could be used to produce an article of a colour that lies on 
the spectrum between red and brown by adjusting the quantities of various inputs used 
in the process.  
It was argued that the specification was not sufficient because it did not give 
sufficient information to enable the person following the process’s steps to obtain the 
result without fresh experiment and research,44 and did not state which shade of red or 
brown would be most commercially useful.45 In response, Lord Halsbury LC 
expressed the view that there was no obligation on the patentee to identify what is the 
‘best colour’ within that spectrum (if such a thing could be ascertained) and describe a 
means of producing an article of that colour.46 
Lord Herschell noted that: 
It was urged by the learned counsel for the respondents that a patentee is 
bound to disclose the means by which his invention may be carried into effect, 
and that if he leaves this to be ascertained by experiments, his patent cannot be 
supported. This is no doubt correct.47 
                                                 
42 (1887) 12 App Cas 710. 
43 Ibid 711. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid 718-720. 
46 Ibid 715. 
47 Ibid 720. 
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His Lordship found that although the patent in question shows a range of colours that 
can be produced and then leaves the person using the process to discover which of 
these colours best suits his purpose at any given time, this does not invalidate the 
patent.48 On this basis, his Lordship held that ‘the evidence satisfies me that when 
once the desired shade is obtained there would be no practical difficulty in repeating 
the process with a reasonable certainty of producing the same result.’ 49 That is, his 
Lordship recognised that once the person by acting within the defined parameters of 
the process had through experimentation struck upon a desired result, he or she could 
exercise a degree of control over the outcome such that the steps could be repeatedly 
invoked to achieve a specific identical or near-identical result each time – despite the 
specification not demonstrating how to produce an article of a particular colour. 
While the court’s finding is instructive in light of the mechanical invention the court 
had before it, the statement of principle is not of assistance where the process is 
subject to extrinsic forces that will cause variability in the results even when the 
person invoking the process repeats the steps of the process using the same 
parameters each time. 
B Methods of Medical Treatment 
One category of patentable subject matter that is susceptible to the effects of extrinsic 
forces is methods of medical treatment. The High Court in Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-
Aventis Australia Pty Ltd50 recently confirmed the long-held view that methods of 
medical treatment are patentable subject matter, provided the remaining patentability 
requirements such as novelty and inventiveness are satisfied. In doing so, the court 
approved the findings in this regard in Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd,51 
and later in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd.52 
The case of Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd,53 concerned a method and 
mask device designed for the treatment of sleep apnoea. The respondents submitted 
that the claim lacked utility because the invention did not effectively treat all patients 
                                                 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 [2013] HCA 50. 
51 (1994) 50 FCR 1. 
52 (2000) 97 FCR 524 (Black CJ, Lehane and Finkelstein JJ). 
53 (1992) 25 IPR 119. This case is the first instance decision of Gummow J, which was upheld on 
appeal in Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 50 FCR 1. 
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suffering the ailment and would not necessarily be an effective treatment where a 
range of extrinsic factors where at play, such as where recipients at the time of 
treatment were suffering hay fever or a cold. The judge at first instance, Gummow J, 
was of the opinion that to demonstrate utility it was not necessary that the promise 
contained in the specification be fulfilled in all cases.54 While his Honour did not seek 
to identify what would be an acceptable rate of failure for this method, he was of the 
view that it was sufficient the claimed invention was ‘plainly of considerable practical 
utility in the treatment of substantial numbers of persons who are “patients” within the 
meaning of [the claim]’.55  
Jagot J adopted the same approach in two recent single-judge decisions. The first, 
Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd And Others v Apotex Pty Ltd (No 3),56 concerned a 
patent for a method of treating the skin disorder psoriasis. The method involved 
administering the compound leflunomide in an in an effective amount to prevent or 
treat the recipient’s psoriasis. Apotex submitted that the invention lacked utility, as 
the method (the administration of leflunomide) would not produce the desired result 
in all patients. Jagot J stated that:  
Not every patient needs to enjoy a significant benefit from the use of a method 
in order for an invention comprising the method to have utility. The lack of a 
100% success rate does not mean that the claim covers means which will not 
produce the desired result and is thereby bad as referred to in Wrigley v 
Cadbury Schweppes at [138]. The claimed method has one means (the 
administration of an effective amount of leflunomide) to one end (the 
prevention or treatment of psoriasis). On the evidence the method as claimed 
is useful: it treats or prevents psoriasis in patients, albeit not with uniform 
levels of success.57 
                                                 
54 Ibid 142. 
55 Ibid 143. 
56 (2011) 196 FCR 1. 
57 Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd and Others v Apotex Pty Ltd (No 3) (2011) 196 FCR 1, 71 [245]. 
The issue of repeatability appears not to have been considered in appeal to the High Court in Apotex 
Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 50. The issue is however mentioned in passing 
at [161] by Hayne J: ‘The effect on the individual can be regarded as artificially created by the method 
of treatment. (No doubt, the individual must respond to the treatment and the treatment may very well 
depend upon responses which could be seen as naturally occurring in response to the treatment. For 
present purposes, however, no attention need be paid to those observations.)’. 
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The second case heard by Jagot J, Apotex Pty Ltd v AstraZeneca AB (No 4),58 
concerned the validity of three patents claiming a methods of treating the condition 
hypercholesterolemia by administering doses of the drug rosuvastatin. In that case, 
her Honour held that in relation to the claims in question, they: ‘do not (indeed, 
cannot) promise absolute efficacy or safety for any patient. That said, it cannot be 
doubted that the claimed invention is useful…’.59 
In the cases in which the repeatability of methods of medical treatment has been 
considered, the issue has been framed as one of the invention’s usefulness. These 
cases recognise that as proponents of new and useful methods of medical treatment 
cannot guarantee success in all cases, patent law should not demand otherwise. The 
result of any given method of medical treatment will ordinarily be variable and are at 
the mercy of extrinsic forces, such those operating within the patient. The cases thus 
recognise that medical treatment does not have to guarantee identical results each 
time it is invoked in order to be useful in a patent law sense. Rather, a method of 
medical treatment will not lack usefulness if it creates the desired result in a 
significant number of intended recipients, with an acceptable rate of failure.  
C Biotechnology 
Since the 1980 US Supreme Court decision in Diamond v Chakrabarty,60 it has been 
clear that there is no prohibition on patenting living things. That case considered the 
patent eligibility of artificially created micro-organisms and processes for their 
manufacture.61  
It would appear that the position in Australia is the same. While the patentability of 
living organisms has not been considered by the courts in Australia, in 1976 in Ranks 
Hovis McDougall Ltd’s Application,62 a Deputy Commissioner of Patents held that 
living organisms may be patentable inventions provided they have improved or 
altered useful properties and not merely changed morphological characteristics which 
have no effect on the working of the organism. Such an outcome is arguably 
                                                 
58 [2013] FCA 162. 
59 Ibid [353]. 
60 447 US 303 (1980). 
61 Diamond v Chakrabarty 447 US 303, 308-309 (1980). 
62 (1976) 46 AOJP 3915. 
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consistent with NRDC, where the High Court held that there are not separate tests for 
subject matter eligibility for different classes or categories of invention.  
Reproducibility and verifiability are the touchstones of the scientific method. For an 
experiment to be accepted as reliable, these require that a published discovery be 
described sufficiently to enable a follow-on researcher to replicate the experiment 
described and to be able to confirm that he or she has indeed successfully reproduced 
the experiment. Patent law, through its patentable subject matter, utility and 
disclosure requirements, should be no different.63 While not having the force of law, 
the manuals of patent practice and procedure published by patent offices are often 
instructive, at least insofar as they document the practices of patent offices. The 
Patents Office within IP Australia in its Australian Patent Office Manual of Practice 
and Procedure,64 recognises that when an invention involves a process for the 
manufacture of a micro-organism, the process may not always be repeatable. The 
Manual of Practice and Procedure states:  
The main difference between inventions involving living and non-living 
systems is that many processes involving living systems are not 100% 
repeatable. In some cases the probability of repeating the invention, even 
using the best method known to the applicant, can be very low. 
Each art has its own standard of repeatability and this must be taken into 
consideration when assessing repeatability of an invention. The issue when 
considering repeatability is not the numerical probability of achieving the 
specified result, but whether the result can be reproduced to a practical level 
acceptable to a person skilled in the art.65 
The manual also provides the following. 
                                                 
63 There are several articles which intimate that the difficulty in replicating biologics might mean that 
the patents in respect of such entities (of processes of manufacture by which such entities result) are 
not properly enabled and thus invalid according to United States law: Dmitry Karshtedt, ‘Limits on 
Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions: Process Elements and Biotechnology’s Compliance with the 
Enablement Requirement’ (2011) 3 Hastings Science & Technology Law Journal 109; Gregory N 
Mandel, ‘The Generic Biologics Debate: Industry’s Unintended Admission that Biotech Patents Fail 
Enablement’ (2006) 11 Virginia Journal of Law & Technology 8. 
64 IP Australia, Australian Patent Office Patent Manual of Practice & Procedure, 2013 
<http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/patentsmanual/WebHelp/Patent_Examiners_Manual.htm> last 
visited at 1 May 2013. 
65 Ibid Part 2.7.2.4 (titled ‘The Issue of Repeatability’). 
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Successful performance of the invention is dependent on chance where the 
person skilled in the art, following the instructions for carrying out the 
invention, finds either that the alleged results are unrepeatable or that success 
is achieved in a totally unreliable way. In this situation, there is a fundamental 
insufficiency in the description of the invention, such that the complete 
specification cannot be considered to provide a clear enough and complete 
enough disclosure. 
However, an invention dependent purely on chance should be distinguished 
from one where repeated success is assured, even though accompanied by a 
proportion of failures (as can arise, for example, in the manufacture of small 
magnetic cores or electronic components). In the latter case, provided the 
‘successes’ can be readily separated from the failures by a non-destructive 
testing procedure, the disclosure of the invention will be sufficiently 
enabling.66  
This demonstrates a recognition by the Australian Patents Office that a process patent 
involving a micro-organism cannot be subject to 100% reproducibility, but rather that 
what is to be achieved is an acceptable level of repeatability for that art by someone in 
skilled in that field. It is interesting to note, however, that unlike the judges in the 
methods of medical treatment cases, the Australian Patents Offices categorises the 
issue of repeatability as one of the sufficiency of description rather than utility.  
Looking abroad, in regard to chemical inventions, the European Patent Office’s 
Technical Board of Appeal said the following. 
It is always the case in chemistry that the outcome of experiments show some 
fluctuations in yield, quality etc. This is irrelevant for sufficiency unless the 
invention requires certain characteristics in this respect. It should therefore be 
even less relevant if only the conditions and the means used to carry out a 
process show inevitable variations as long as the ultimate result is the same.67  
What must also be considered in relation to biotech inventions is chance, because an 
invention dependent purely on chance will not be useful and will not satisfy patent 
                                                 
66 Ibid Part 2.11.3.4.2A (titled ‘Section 40 Enabling Disclosures’). 
67 Unilever/Preprothaumatin (T 281186), [1989] 0J EPO 202. 
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law’s requirements. An invention dependent purely on chance should be distinguished 
from one where a sufficient degree of both success and consistency of result is 
assured with repetition, even though there may be a proportion of failures. In this 
regard, it is necessary that the person following the instructions laid out in the 
specification have a degree of control over the outcome of the process. 
In President and Fellows of Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents),68 
the Federal Court of Appeal of Canada identified a connection between repeatability 
and the inventor’s disclosure providing a means of having control over the essential 
characteristics of the resulting product. The case involved various claims to produce a 
transgenic animal (a mouse) susceptible to cancer by using an activated oncogene 
sequence for the purpose of conducting carcinogenicity studies on animals. Although 
the overruled on appeal by the Supreme Court of Canada on the ground that higher 
life forms such as the oncomouse are not patentable subject matter,69 the court’s 
comments in relation to repeatability remain instructive.  
Writing on behalf of the majority, Rothstein JA held that the need for a person 
replicating a claimed process to have sufficient control over the essential 
characteristics of the resulting product is implied in the requirement that an invention 
be useful.70 His Honour concluded that although ‘the inventors do not have, or claim 
to have, control over the length of the oncomouse’s tail, the colour of its eyes or the 
texture of its fur’ and that these characteristics are not readily reproducible, these 
characteristics are irrelevant to the usefulness of the invention.71 Rather, Rothstein JA 
found that:  
All that is important for the usefulness of the product (the use of the 
oncomouse in carcinogenicity studies) is that, using the methods described by 
the inventors, a mouse is produced with all of its cells affected by the 
oncogene. That the other genes of the mouse are not under the control of the 
inventors does not detract from the usefulness of the invention.72 
                                                 
68 [2000] 4 FC 528 (Rothstein JA, Linden JA, Isaac JA dissenting). 
69 Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents) [2002] 4 SCR 45, [153]. 
70 President and Fellows of Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents) [2000] 4 FC 528, 
[148]-[152]. 
71 Ibid [155], [164]. 
72 Ibid [155]. 
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It was on this basis that Rothstein JA found that the means of producing an 
oncomouse described in the specification was sufficiently repeatable (or reproducible, 
to use the expression his Honour used) and sufficiently capable to control the essential 
characteristics of the invention to justify a patent. It would seem that these are 
principles that could equally be applied in Australian law. 
D Business Methods 
That business methods are patentable subject matter in Australia was acknowledged 
by Heerey J in Welcome Real-Time SA v Catuity Inc. (‘Welcome Real-Time v 
Catuity’),73 and later confirmed by the Full Federal Court in Grant v Commissioner of 
Patents.74  
The invention considered in Welcome Real-Time v Catuity is a method and device for 
the operation of smart cards in connection with traders’ loyalty programs. The patent 
in question describes the invention as being one making it possible for a particular 
trader to grant a customer ‘specific benefits in a customised and immediate manner, 
and which may moreover be recorded on the card’ and to ‘recognise a customer on 
the basis of the frequency with which he calls in and the size of his spending’.75 Those 
specific benefits are rewards points recorded on the card’s chip that can be redeemed 
for products or discount vouchers printed at the time of the purchase.76 Then, it 
provides various examples as to how a particular trader might allocate these benefits 
to customers.77 Thus, the invention is a system of providing loyalty rewards that 
utilises the storage capacity of a ‘smart’ card in a novel way. 
At trial the submission was made that the invention was not useful for the reason that 
certain claimed advantages could not be realised by the invention.78 In response, 
Heerey J said the following.  
I accept the applicant’s submission that the results mentioned are not promised 
for all embodiments of the invention. The specification makes it clear that 
each particular trader may choose the manner in which he or she wishes to 
                                                 
73 (2001) 113 FCR 110 (Heerey J). 
74 (2006) 154 FCR 62. 
75 Welcome Real-Time SA v Catuity Inc (2001) 113 FCR 110, 117. 
76 Ibid 119. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid 144-145. 
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operate his or her program or programs. Accordingly, an embodiment of the 
invention may give some results and not others depending on what the 
participating traders wish to do.79 
From this statement it is clear that his Honour accepted that a process is useful even if 
it allows for decision making that causes non-identical results. Like the House of 
Lords in Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik v Levinstein, his Honour appreciated that 
the results of the process might depend upon decisions made by the person invoking 
the process, and that as a consequence, the process would not achieve uniform results 
when different decisions were made as to how to implement the constituent steps. 
Presumably also his Honour would, in the absence of the influence of extrinsic 
factors, agree with Lord Hershell’s finding in Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik v 
Levinstein, that once the person began repeating the process using the same 
parameters, that person could achieve identical or near-identical results each time.80 
However, business methods are also potentially subject to extrinsic forces that may 
cause different results to be achieved than if the methods were invoked in 
circumstances where they are not subject to those forces. In the absence of specific 
judicial consideration on point, it should be presumed that the statements of principle 
expounded in the medical treatment methods cases81 as to processes that cannot 
achieve uniform levels of success would apply equally to analogous business method 
and other inventions. 
IV CONCLUSION 
The conclusion reached in this article is that Australian patent law certainly does 
contain a repeatability requirement, but does not require that a patentable process 
must yield identical or even near-identical results each and every time it is invoked. A 
claimed invention will be sufficiently repeatable or reproducible if a person following 
the steps prescribed by the inventor can predict with some certainty, or has a degree 
of control over, the essential characteristics of the result produced by the process. In 
other words, whenever the claimed process is worked, a desired result that lies within 
                                                 
79 Ibid 145. 
80 Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik v Levinstein (1887) 12 App Cas 710, 720. 
81 Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd (1992) 25 IPR 119 (Gummow J); Sanofi-Aventis 
Australia Pty Ltd And Others v Apotex Pty Ltd (No 3) (2011) 196 FCR 1 (Jagot J); Apotex Pty Ltd v 
AstraZeneca AB (No 4) [2013] FCA 162 (Jagot J). 
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the parameters specified by the inventor must inevitably follow most of the time. 
Further, a claimed process must achieve a result promised in the specification either 
with an acceptable rate of failure, or within an acceptable range of possible results, as 
can be expected given the nature of the process and the inputs chosen by the person 
using the process. Arguably, what is an acceptable rate of failure or an acceptable 
range of possible results may in difficult cases be a matter to be resolved by reference 
to the expert evidence of persons skilled in the art. 
While the need for a process to be repeatable is potentially an issue of patentable 
subject matter or sufficiency of description, it will ordinarily be judged as one of 
usefulness. However, it is also arguable that if a process does not produce 
substantially similar results then it will not be a manner of manufacture within the 
meaning of that term as it is used in s 18 of the Act and s 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies.  
The exact nature of the kind and degree of repeatability necessary to invoke 
usefulness and subject matter eligibility will vary according to the type of process 
claimed. For processes that permit decision making by whoever invokes the process, 
one embodiment of the invention may give certain results and not others depending 
on the choices made by the person using the process. Thus, the success of the process 
is defined by whether it permits a range of results referable to the process as described 
in the patent specification, not identical or near-identical results every time it is 
invoked. This is necessary to accommodate process inventions that allow the person 
using the process a degree of flexibility to determine the features of the resulting 
product, which might for example include its colour, tensile strength, yield or industry 
focus. However, in the absence of extrinsic forces influencing the result, once the 
person using the process has struck upon a desired result by acting within the 
parameters of the process, that result should be capable of being controlled such that it 
can be repeated identically or near-identically each time the process is invoked to 
achieve identical or near-identical results.  
For processes subject to extrinsic forces, the better view would appear to be that a 
process does not need to be exactly repeatable 100% of the time, but that rather that it 
need only be repeatable a substantial amount of the time, or repeatable with a rate of 
failure acceptable to a person skilled in the relevant field. This makes sense when one 
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considers methods of medical treatment, and the fact that one cannot expected a 
particular treatment to successfully treat all patients all of the time. Rather, methods 
of treating the human body interact with the body’s chemistry and physiology and 
with foreign elements such as other medicines. As extrinsic forces such as these 
create complications, it must be accepted that although a vast majority of patients 
might take the benefit of a treatment as intended, the fact of an acceptable degree of 
failure does not render the treatment process unpatentable because of a lack of utility. 
It is likewise with inventions in the sciences and biotechnology: due to the variable 
nature of chemical entities, many chemical processes cannot be guaranteed of success 
all of the time. Similarly, extrinsic forces may conceivably affect the nature of the 
results obtained if the type or extent of those forces might vary each time a process is 
invoked. For processes of this kind, the process is repeatable if it permits results 
within a range specified or implied in the disclosure of the invention most of the time. 
As a consequence, patent law does not, and cannot, make its protections predicated 
upon process inventions achieving the same, or even successful, results each and 
every time. This proposition is in line with the approach taken by Gummow J in 
Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd,82 that a claimed invention will be 
sufficiently repeatable it is ‘plainly of considerable practical utility’ in achieving the 
desired goal in a substantial number of cases. 
It is perhaps not possible to generalise across different classes or categories of 
patentable subject matter as to what degree of repeatability is required for an 
invention to be patentable. One cannot, for instance, necessarily say that all industrial 
manufacturing processes require a higher degree of repeatability than all methods of 
medical treatment or diagnosis. It might be assumed that a manufacturing process by 
which ball bearings are manufactured would involve a lower acceptable rate of failure 
than a genetic cancer diagnostic test. However, even in industrial manufacturing 
processes whereby tangible physical artefacts are produced, that one might presume 
would ordinarily operate with a very small rate of error, are subject to extrinsic forces 
that can cause a claimed process to fail in the same way that a method of treating 
disease may be ineffective for some patients. Conversely, there might for example be 
forms of medical treatment or diagnosis that are guaranteed of success each time they 
are used regardless of the patient. Regardless, what can be said is that processes that 
                                                 
82 Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd (1992) 25 IPR 119, 143. 
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are dependent upon favourable environmental factors or decision making by the 
person invoking the process – whether they be manufacturing processes, business 
methods, methods of treating the human body, methods of medical diagnosis or 
processes to produce living things – must be expected to achieve results 
commensurate with the inputs used and the nature of the process with a degree of 
failure acceptable to a person skilled in the art. 
Questions as to the degree to which an invention must be repeatable and achieve 
consistent and predictable results involve striking a necessary balance, on the one 
hand, between encouraging useful and socially-beneficial innovation that will 
increase productivity and people’s standards of living,83 and on the other, ensuring 
that what is protected is capable of producing beneficial results.  
 
                                                 
83 See generally, United States Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper 
Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy (2003) 1, citing Federal Reserve Board Vice 
Chairman Roger W Ferguson Jr, ‘Patent Policy in a Broader Context’ (Speech delivered at the 2003 
Financial Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Sea Island, Georgia, 5 April 
2003): ‘innovation benefits consumers through the development of new and improved goods, services, 
and processes. An economy’s capacity for invention and innovation helps drive its economic growth 
and the degree to which standards of living increase.’ 
